






nvestment in new technologies, such as fibre-optic
networks is a necessary precondition for reaching
the aims of the Lisbon agenda.In this paper,it will be
argued that under market conditions investment pro-
jects that imply high levels of risk will only be under-
taken if economic framework conditions are suitable
to enhance innovation. At present, however, regula-
tory policies might tend to hamper investment incen-
tives, thus delaying the leap into the digital age. In
particular, access regulation of newly built networks
seems to have a negative impact on the readiness to
invest and innovate. There is clear evidence that the
US telecommunications policy has recognized these
regulatory shortcomings and implemented a much
more liberal regime. As a result, huge investments
have been stimulated by the deregulation of broad-
band access. This paper, thus, refers to the current
investment plans of Europe’s largest telecommunica-
tion company, Deutsche Telekom, and the debate
that has arisen around the regulatory constraints to
be imposed on the newly built infrastructures.
Fibre-optic networks 
Over the last decade,the development of the market
for telecommunication services
has shown an ever greater need
for bandwidth in order to
respond to the requirements set
by innovative applications.
Triple play, the integration of
telephony, internet services and
broadcasting in one service, is
just one very simple possible
service application. Probably
more exciting ones will emerge from working with
the network. History shows that the technology
offers options, and it is for the users to decide which
applications to generate.Indeed,Zysman and Weber
(2000) identify as the central element of the
“American network revolution”that it is user driven.
Users develop innovations or ask for improvements
and new services while they experiment with new
technologies. Hence, the actual potential of
advanced infrastructures will only reveal itself in the
process of usage. Past experience suggests that there
is a high probability that fibre optic networks will
induce a whole series of product and service innova-
tions (see also Caillaud and Jullien 2003).
Advanced infrastructures can generate surprising
and revolutionary innovations. Jaron Lanier, a pio-
neer computer scientist, relates the development of
large search engines, such as Google or Yahoo, to
first experiments with a high speed pioneer internet
version (Internet 2) that were not aimed at a partic-
ular application. Other prominent examples of
unforeseen success stories that have relied on
insightful infrastructure investment are e-mail and
SMS (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23 June 2006).
Röller and Waverman (2003) have shown that there
is a strong correlation between investment in
telecommunication infrastructures and economic
growth. This direct link is also at the core of the
Lisbon agenda and the i2010 initiative (Commission
2005). However, Europe, and in particular Germany,
are falling behind, as shown in Figure 1.Therefore, it
is essential for technology policy to support the con-
struction of advanced networks and thus to promote
growth and employment.
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Infrastructure projects require the long-term invest-
ment of substantial amounts of capital. The risks
involved in this will only be borne by the investing
firm,if there is a prospect of competitive first-mover-
advantages and future gains to pay back the
advanced capital and to earn necessary capital for
replacement and expansion of the infrastructure. If
the mechanism of rewarding extraordinary risk is no
longer in place, potential investors will be reluctant
to engage in infrastructure projects. If technological
innovations are produced in short sequence, in
vestors need to amortise their investment rapidly.
Determining in advance the likely amortisation peri-
od for Deutsche Telekom’s fibre optic network so
that the regulator can impose the “right” price for
access seems an insurmountable task.
The Commission argues that broadband penetration
depends on the intensity of competition in a market
and this, in turn depends on regulatory measures
establishing competitive market regimes.Apart from
the fact that the analyses cited by the Commission
bear important flaws (see Indepen Report 2006),1
relating broadband penetration exclusively to regu-
lation seems too simplistic. The links constructed
from regulation to competition to price and from
there to broadband penetration are often weak, and
many examples exist that contradict this pattern.For
instance, Greece has a high level of competition, but
low broadband penetration, and Denmark, on the
other hand, combines high broadband prices with
one of the highest penetration rates in Europe.
It would go beyond the scope of this paper to discuss
all the facets of arguments put forward in the
debate.2 Therefore, the following chapters will focus
on four main strands of arguments: the relation
between investment and regulation, the ladder of
investment hypothesis,the bottleneck argument,and
the “new and emerging market” debate 
This paper discusses general issues of the relation
between investment and regulation, albeit from a
German perspective.Regulatory measures proposed
by the German regulator and the European
Commission are discussed in the light of innovation
and competition theories, empirical evidence and
experience from other countries.
Investment and regulation
In the context of the Lisbon strategy, investment in
high-speed networks is of eminent importance for
Germany and Europe alike.However,telecommunica-
tion infrastructures are not being built in a liberalised
market environment but are subject to intensive regu-
latory scrutiny.Indeed,the EU Commission insists that
access to the VDSL3 network that Deutsche Telekom
plans to build in 50 German cities has to be put under
ex-ante regulation. It is argued that the lack of infra-
structure competition in the German market may lead
to the emergence of a new monopoly. Ex-ante access
regulation is presented as the only way to grant com-
petitors access to an essential facility.
Regulated prices for unbundled local loops can,
however, keep market incentives for infrastructure
deployment artificially low (Bauer 2006). They are
likely to send out the wrong signals, as it will proba-
bly always be much more efficient for competitors to
use a dominant operator’s network under regulated
conditions than investing in their own facilities.
Vogelsang sees a high risk in non-regulation, as a
decision in favour of exemption will cause objection
and result in lengthy legal procedures (Vogelsang
2006). However, this argument holds for both
options. Regulating the new network will slow down
investment, because it will lead to long debates on
the “right” access prices and leave all potential
investors with a high level of uncertainty with
respect to expected returns.According to Blum et al.
(2005), the risk of regulatory intervention makes
investment plans subject to considerable uncertainty,
because price can no longer be used as a strategic
variable to attract consumers or to occupy a compet-
itive position. Moreover, ex-ante access regulation
(at whatever price) diminishes first-mover-advan-
tages, which are highly important for innovation and
competition in dynamic markets such as telecommu-
nications.
As the Commission rightly states, it is extremely dif-
ficult for a regulator to correctly assess risks of an
1 The correlation used in the report is based on a ‘regulatory score-
card’ provided by ECTA (ECTA 2006) that has been heavily criti-
cised (Indepen Report 2006).As a consequence the Commission is
now using an indicator provided by the OECD (Commission Staff
Working Paper 2006). However, even this indicator seems hardly
appropriate,since it was last updated in 2003,but the main progress
in broadband deployment has been made in the last two years. In
addition, it is doubtful, whether the variables used in the OECD
indicator are suitable to capture those elements of regulation that
influence broadband penetration.
2 The hearing conducted by the Bundesnetzagentur on this issue
has produced a series of contributions that document the state of
the debate. See http:// bundesnetzagentur.de. 3 Very high speed Digital Subscriber Line.investment and to include the “right” risk premium
in the regulated price. However, the solutions pro-
posed, namely cooperation between regulators and
referring to the competences of the Commission
(Commission 2006), are not convincing, because
experience from one investment can hardly be trans-
ferred to investments that are conducted at a differ-
ent time and in different markets; and “co-opera-
tion” and the centralisation of competences cannot
effectively substitute for market mechanisms.
Mistakes that have been made in the past (e.g., by
setting regulated prices for network access too low
to stimulate investment in cable infrastructures)
should not be used as a justification for a need for
regulation today (Dahlke and Neumann 2006).
Instead of deploring a lack of competition at the
infrastructure level, and preventing this competition
to develop at the same time, the regulator should
stimulate investment in alternative infrastructures
and, thus, increase the intensity of inter-platform
competition.
The “ladder of investment” hypothesis
The regulatory approach adopted by the Commission
is based on the belief that creating favourable access
conditions for market entrants at the service level will
eventually motivate them to build up their own infra-
structures – or to climb up an imagined “investment
ladder”. The concept was originally based on an
CESifo DICE Report 3/2006 24
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Box: The debate about the effects of unbundling on investment
Positive effects
• Willing et al. (2002) confirm the “competitive stimulus hypothesis”: they have found that low unbundling rates
induce competition and thus stimulate investment by incumbents: “a one percent decrease in the
UNE-P
a) rate generatedbetween a 2.1 and 2.9 percent increase in ILEC
b) investment”.
• Phoenix Center Study (2003). According to this study the 1996 Telecommunications Act has created 92 000 jobs
and has had a positive impact on CAPEX
c) andproductivity.
Negative effects
• Hazlett and Bazelon (2005) and Hausman and Sidak (2004) find that the stepping-stone and ladder-of-
investment hypotheses are not supported by their theoretical analysis.
• Haring and Rohlfs (2002), Pindyck (2004) conclude on the basis of a real options approach that infrastructure
investment has declined as a consequence of local loop unbundling.
• Haring, Rettle et al. (2002), Crandall and Singer (2003), Ingraham and Sidak (2003), Eisenach, Lowengrub
et al. (2003) state that high prices for unbundling induce high investment in the network and raise the
incumbent’s market capitalisation.
• Crandall, Ingraham andSinger (2004): The lower prices for the unbundled local loop, the lower is the investment
of competitors in network infrastructure. The step from operating on the basis of rented lines towards the
building up of separate networks is not being done by market participants.
• Wallsten (2005), Cambridge Strategic Management Group(2002) can show that the higher the share of rented
local loops is, the more slowly broadband access rates are rising. Martin (2005): The access rules inhibit 
deployment of infrastructure. 
For Europe: 
• Credit Suisse First Boston(2005):There is little incentive from a regulatory perspective for incumbents in
Europe to pursue FTTP.
d)
Ambivalent results 
• Chang/Koski/ Majumdar (2003) have concluded that in the US lower interconnection prices  have stimulated
investment by the incumbents. However, they have found the contrary when studying European countries, albeit
on the basis of not satisfactory data.  
• Garcia Murillo and Gabel (2003): There is no significant impact of unbundling on broadband diffusion, but
measures to promote competitionhave a positive impact. However, regulatory measures should take country-
specific factors, such as income levels into account.
a) Unbundled Network Elements Platform.  –
b) Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier.  –
c) Capital Expenditure.  –  
d) Fibre to the Premisses.
Source: Based on Markova 2006.CESifo DICE Report 3/2006 25
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analysis of the Dutch case, and it was an ex-post
explanation of the path of development of competi-
tion. As such, it was not meant to provide a manual
for regulators or a bluebook for the micro-manage-
ment of markets (see Cave and Vogelsang 2003).
However,up to now,there is little empirical evidence
of the functioning of the ladder. On the contrary,
some American authors have shown that in the US
cheap and easy access to the existing network has
worked as a disincentive rather than an incentive for
infrastructure investment. Unbundling obligations
imposed on the dominant network provider have
resulted in a reduction of investment in the network
by the network owners as well as to reluctance of
competitors to engage in costly and risky infrastruc-
ture projects (e.g., Hazlett and Bazelon 2005).4 This
has given rise to a fundamental change in regulatory
policy: unbundling obligations were abolished, and
the market for broadband access was deregulated.
This new regulatory style went along with the substi-
tution of a static concept of competition by a dynam-
ic approach. In a static view, market configurations
and market entrance are the central concern of the
regulator.In a dynamic concept higher levels of con-
centration and the temporary dominance of individ-
ual players are tolerated for the sake of a dynamic
development of technologies and innovation (see,
for example,Bauer 2006).The overview shown in the
Box summarises the debate.
The statistics on infrastructure
investment by RBOCs (Regio-
nal Bell Operating Companies)
in the US support the hypothesis
of a trade-off between unbundl-
ing obligations and investment
levels:the following graph shows
a clear decline of infrastructure
investment with the increase of
unbundled local loops (see
Figure 2).
Not surprisingly, therefore,
Crandall, Ingraham and Singer
(2004) conclude:“The best argu-
ment for maintaining the current
unbundling regime – namely,
that low UNE5 rates encourage
CLECs6 to rent at first,and then build facilities once
they have some market experience – is not support-
ed by the data.”
These insights seem to have little influence on the
concepts used in Europe. The Commission denies
the negative effects of strict unbundling obligations
on infrastructure investment and claims the oppo-
site, albeit with a weak statistical basis (Commission
2006 and Indepen Report 2006). Most surprisingly, a
report by London Economics (2006) which the
Commission advertises as evidence for its position
does not support the claimed relationship (Press
release JP/06/1123).
In Germany, the regulator takes the fact that invest-
ment by competitors has been higher than that of the
incumbent in 2004 as an indicator for the effective
transition from service-based to facilities-based com-
petition (Bundesnetzagentur 2006). However, the
figures provided do not differentiate between invest-
ment in fixed and in mobile networks. It can be
assumed that the argument does not hold,when only
investment in fixed networks is considered.
A prominent example of a successful market driven
infrastructure project is the cable network in the US.
An unregulated environment has led investors to build
up cable infrastructures to compete with the DSL (dig-
ital subscriber line) network which was highly regulat-
ed at the time. As a consequence, cable plays a very
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DEVELOPMENT OF INVESTMENT OF REGIONAL NETWORK OPERATORS
 IN RELATION TO UNBUNDLING IN THE US, 2000 TO 2004
in $ billions in millions 
Correlation (2000 to 2004) = -0.97
Figure 2
4 Crandall, Ingraham and Singer (2004); Pindyck (2004), Haring
and Rohlfs (2002), Hazlett and Bazelon (2005), Hausman and
Sidak (2004), Haring, Rettle et al. (2002), Crandall and Singer
(2003), Ingraham and Sidak (2003), Eisenach, Lowengrub et al.
(2003).
5 Unbundeled Network Elements.
6 Competitive Local Exchange Carrier.while investment in DSL remained behind expecta-
tions. The existence of an alternative infrastructure
reduces the need for regulatory intervention, which is
a benefit in itself,and it leaves the consumer with more
options than without competing infrastructures.
The bottleneck argument
Regulation of telecommunication networks is often
justified with the existence of bottlenecks controlled
by monopolistic operators.These bottlenecks do not
allow competitors to offer services that rely on so-
called essential facilities (e.g., Knieps and Blankart
2006;Vogelsang 2006; Neumann and Scherer 2006).
A distinction has to be made as to whether bottle-
necks are the result of natural monopolies or
whether they are a consequence of former state
monopolies or licence policies or even static ex-ante
regulation itself. In a natural monopoly regulation
might be justified to counterbalance an automatic
gravitation towards monopolies. However, even
technical restrictions claimed to inevitably create a
natural monopoly evaporate with technical progress.
For example, access in the local loop: alternative
technologies, such as WIMAX7 or satellite transmis-
sion can substitute bottlenecks in wire-based net-
works. These technical options should be carefully
explored before claiming the existence of “natural
monopolies”. It is doubtful that a technical bottle-
neck actually exists in high speed broadband net-
works in Germany, in particular if an awakening
cable infrastructure is taken into account.
If bottlenecks result from persistent market configu-
rations,regulation has the purpose of creating incen-
tives to eliminate these kinds of bottlenecks.
Regulatory measures which perpetuate their exis-
tence are therefore jeopardising the long-term aims
of the regulatory process and are to be rejected. If
the provider of a newly built network is obliged to
share this network under conditions imposed by the
regulator, there is no incentive for competitors to
bypass the bottleneck. This is the case of the VDSL
network to be built-up by Deutsche Telekom.
Regulating the new network would mean to support
the emergence of a new bottleneck and to prevent
the long term disappearance of bottlenecks (see also
Bourreau and Dog ˘an 2001).It therefore perpetuates
the need for regulation.
Bottlenecks should not be confused with compara-
tive advantages gained by innovators through invest-
ment in new technology.It is the very nature of inno-
vations to create such “bottlenecks”, namely facili-
ties that competitors cannot immediately replicate.
The idea of competition would be completely
thwarted, if new technical assets that an innovator
creates would immediately be subject to regulated
access by its competitors.
In the debate on the regulation of Deutsche
Telekom’s fibre-optic network, it is argued that the
newly built facilities must be subject to regulated
access because the basic telecommunication network
has been built with tax payers’ money. However the
existing network is no longer the one “inherited”
from monopoly times. The “old” network has been
continuously updated and no longer contains many
elements of the network that existed when the
monopoly was abolished. It is doubtful, in any case,
whether the incumbent’s network is still publicly
financed, since with the privatisation of the incum-
bent telecom operators, all the assets of the former
monopolist were bought and paid by shareholders
and are, thus, privately owned. This argumentation
has found clear support by a recent decision of the
German Constitutional Court.
New and emerging markets
The European Regulatory Framework exempts so-
called “emerging markets” from regulation. The
German government has implemented this rule by
introducing Art. 9a in the Law on Telecommuni-
cations.
Therefore, if the investment in a high-speed fibre
optic network creates a “new market”, regulation
does not have to be discussed.The tricky question is
now, how to identify a new market. For some
authors, the existence of a “new” market requires an
“innovation” (e.g. Vogelsang 2006). The notion of
“innovation” itself is not undisputed, but some clari-
fications are made by the Oslo Manual8: “… the
implementation of a new or significantly improved
(good or service), or process, a new marketing
method, or a new organisational method in business
practices, workplace organisation or external rela-
tions” (OECD and Eurostat 2005, p.46).
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This definition is widely accepted and extensively
used in practice.It comprises incremental innovation
(significant improvements), and, thus, technologies
which build on previous technology but allow for the
realisation of new adoptions – such as the planned
fibre optic network. There is a consensus in innova-
tion research that in Germany incremental innova-
tions have always been more important than radical
innovations and that German industry has been very
successful with this model (see, for example, Soskice
1997, Abramson et al. 1997, Edquist 1997, BMBF
2006). Therefore, “incremental innovation” is a con-
cept which is commonly used and has high explana-
tory power.9
As mentioned above, the innovative power of the
technology lies in the applications.These innovations
will emerge when the users of VDSL networks start
to exploit the technical potential of VDSL.
Therefore, the innovations to be generated cannot
be described at the moment; it is for the market to
decide what they will be. The emerging market
clause responds to exactly this phenomenon:as mar-
kets are not there, but only ‘emerging’, it cannot be
said what the market configuration and competitive
situation will be.
Conclusions
The crucial question is not whether there is a funda-
mental contradiction between investment and regu-
lation, but whether in certain circumstances and
under certain market constellations regulation has a
negative impact on investment incentives and inno-
vation. If regulation is supposed to establish compe-
tition,but obviously regulatory measures do not pro-
vide any incentive to overcome an existing monopo-
listic infrastructure shortage,for example by creating
alternative infrastructures, extending these regulato-
ry measures into the next infrastructure generation
contradicts the core purpose of regulation.
The currently reigning regulatory regime seemingly
promotes competition, starting from the correct
assumption that competition is the main driver for
investment and growth.However,in relying on a sta-
tic concept of competition, this approach results in
the destruction of competitiveness.Any competitive
process needs winners; to forbid winners to win by
stigmatising any above-average profit paralyses the
dynamics of growth in an economy. Europe can only
reach its ambitious goals by stimulating innovative-
ness and efficiency. International competitiveness
requires the highest level of technological expertise
and the most advanced technological infrastructures.
It also requires competition at all levels and not a
static concept of market configuration and the fear-
ful truncation of any non-regulated initiative.
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